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The Role of ESG Rating Agencies and Market
Efficiency in Europe’s Climate Policy
Ebbe Rogge & Lara Ohnesorge*

ABSTRACT
The European Union (“EU”) set out an ambitious policy agenda to
reduce its impact on climate change. Although the popular image is that
economic growth and sustainability are practically incompatible, this
policy agenda includes measures enabling reallocation of investment
towards sustainable projects and companies. This paper posits that, by
adopting measures requiring the disclosure of non-financial and in
particular Environmental, Social, and Governance (“ESG”) information,
EU policy relies on market efficiency to ensure the desired reallocation of
investment.
In order for this market efficiency approach to work properly, nonfinancial information must be accessible, comparable, and verified. This
creates a new role for (non-financial) information verifiers, such as ESG
Rating Agencies. Their role, as observed with Credit Rating Agencies, thus
becomes twofold: reducing the non-financial information asymmetry and
performing an almost regulatory function on sustainability. This paper
examines the impact of ESG Rating Agencies, suggesting that
methodologies differ widely although industry consolidation has improved
uniformity. Furthermore, the combined measurement of ‘E’, ‘S’, and ‘G’
could lead to decent overall ratings but with poor scores for ‘E’.
This paper concludes that increased oversight and regulation of ESG
Rating Agencies may be required to ensure they fulfill their role in enabling
this market-based approach towards tackling climate change.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades, public attention has increased towards one
of the greatest human-induced environmental challenges of our time,
climate change.1 This threat has triggered an internationally coordinated
response, beginning with the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (“IPCC”) in 1988.2 Its objective is to analyze published
literature on (human-induced) climate change and produce review reports.
These reports contribute to the establishment of international treaties such
as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(“UNFCCC”).3 Despite the global nature of the problem, responses by
various nations and regions have differed.4 In 2015, the UNFCCC was
updated and agreed upon at a conference in Paris, commonly known as the
Paris Agreement.5 The Paris Agreement includes a commitment to a longterm goal pursuing efforts to limit the increase of the global temperature to
a maximum of 1.5 degrees Celsius, in line with the analysis done by the
IPCC.6 The agreement appears to be based on a “bottom-up” approach: it
provides parties (States) with the discretion to establish their mitigation

1. See generally WashPostPR, The Washington Post Wins the 2020 Pulitzer Prize
for Explanatory Reporting for Groundbreaking Climate Change Coverage, WASH. POST
(May 4, 2020), https://perma.cc/A4YB-MMKD; Henry Fountain, Climate Change Is
Accelerating, Bringing World “Dangerously Close” to Irreversible Change, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 4, 2019), https://perma.cc/K6MA-EMWJ; Alice Bell, Sixty Years of Climate Change
Warnings: The Signs that Were Missed (and Ignored), GUARDIAN (July 5, 2021),
https://perma.cc/96ZF-8RAQ; Levi Pulkkinen, “We Thought It Wouldn’t Affect Us”:
Heatwave Forces Climate Reckoning in Pacific North-West, GUARDIAN (July 3, 2021),
https://perma.cc/BC4H-2YZ2; Daniel Judt et al., To Save the EU, Its Leaders Must Focus
on Saving the Planet, GUARDIAN (July 27, 2020), https://perma.cc/VP7X-XSKP.
2. History of the IPCC, IPCC, https://perma.cc/5645-3S2M.
3. See generally The Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC, U.N. CLIMATE CHANGE,
https://perma.cc/AB3U-WPUG (the fifth assessment report was published in 2014); About
the Secretariat, U.N. CLIMATE CHANGE, https://perma.cc/AB3J-FWNG.
4. Compare Jennifer Huang, Exploring Climate Framework Laws and The Future of
Climate Action, 38 PACE ENV’T L. REV. 285, 291–302 (2021) (discussing recent trends in
the adoption of climate framework laws in the U.K., Mexico, New Zealand, and Denmark),
with Cinnamon Carlarne, Climate Change Policies an Ocean Apart: EU & US Climate
Change Policies Compared, 14 PENN. ST. ENV’T L. REV. 435, 437–39 (2006) (comparing
the U.S. and EU climate change policies), and Jutta Brunnee, Europe, the United States, and
the Global Climate Regime: All Together Now, 24 J. LAND USE & ENV’T L. 1, 9–20 (2008)
(analyzing the motivating factors that shape the U.S. and EU climate policies). See also P.T.
MUCHLINSKI, Environmental Issues, in MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE AND THE LAW 606
(2021) (providing an overview of corporate environmental regulation in).
5. The Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. N O. 16-1104; e.g., The Paris Agreement, U.N. CLIMATE
CHANGE, https://perma.cc/LFF5-D4AZ.
6. Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5º C, IPCC, https://perma.cc/6AUK-5P48.
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targets.7 As a result, it may place a heavy reliance on industry or nongovernmental organization (“NGO”) initiatives (private climate
governance schemes) where parties (States) are less ambitious. 8 Private
climate governance could, in practice, include voluntary disclosure of
climate-related information, voluntary emission reductions, or carbon
labeling.9
The European Union (“EU”), in light of its obligations under the Paris
Agreement, has in recent years set out a comprehensive climate policy
agenda. The EU’s climate policy agenda contains several major initiatives.
For example, the action plan on financing sustainable growth10 and the
European Green Deal,11 which in turn includes the European Green Deal
Investment Plan.12 This “green policy agenda” sets out major regulatory
proposals for corporations and financial market participants.13 Although the
EU has reframed certain objectives into market projects before, the current
integration of sustainability into an economic agenda does demonstrate a
remarkable shift in economic thinking. Economic growth has long and
often been contrasted to environmental sustainability, the latter being
characterized as a purely altruistic endeavor.14 The notion that economic
progress and sustainability are mutually exclusive or are part of some costbenefit tradeoff is changing.15 The EU’s aim is to reorient capital toward a
sustainable economy by making available information for investors to
make more sustainable choices. Indeed, the approach relies to a large extent
on the willingness of investors to take responsibility and invest in
sustainable growth.

7. Maria L. Banda, The Bottom-Up Alternative: the Mitigation Potential of Private
Climate Governance after the Paris Agreement, 42 HARV. ENV’T REV. 325, 327 (2018).
8. Banda, supra note 7, at 340–41.
9. Id. at 355–57; see also Michael P. Vandenbergh et al., The Gap-Filling Role of
Private Environmental Governance, 38 VA. ENV’T L.J. 1, 32, 38, 45 (2020).
10. Renewed Sustainable Finance Strategy and Implementation of the Action Plan
on Financing Sustainable Growth, EUR. COMM’N (Mar. 8, 2018), https://perma.cc/3SFVUK8R; Action Plan: Financing Sustainable Growth, Communication from European
Commission, COM(2018) 97 final (Mar. 8, 2018).
11. A European Green Deal, EUR. COMM’N, https://perma.cc/GT9H-QPYA.
12. Financing the Green Transition: The European Green Deal Investment Plan and
Just Transition Mechanism, EUR. COMM’N (Jan. 14, 2020), https://perma.cc/684A-6CBV.
13. See Lara Ohnesorge & Ebbe Rogge, Europe’s Green Policy: Towards a Climate
Neutral Economy by Way of Investors’ Choice, 18 EUR. CO. L. 34, 34–39 (2021).
14. See generally Joan Martinez Alier, Socially Sustainable Economic De-Growth,
40 DEV. CHANGE 1099, 1099 (2009) (asserting that economic growth and sustainability are
incompatible).
15. See generally Michael A. Livermore et al., Symposium Panel: Economics &
Environmental Policy, 28 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 49, 54–56 (2020) (describing a beneficial
relationship between economics and environmental decision making).
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There is a noticeable discrepancy between the attention for
sustainable management and what is actually happening to our planet.16
Although there is an increasing interest in climate change over the last
decade or two, the climate crisis is worsening rapidly, which implies the
EU’s approach simply has to work. To make the EU’s approach of
relocating capital a reality, non-financial information and its verification
are essential for investors to make informed investment choices. Hence, the
EU has prepared ample legislation to expand, morph, and use this nonfinancial information for measuring the impact of corporations on climate
change. This approach is not unlike the previously developed concept of
Corporate Social Responsibility (“CSR”), which pertains to measuring the
broader impact of corporations on society and the environment.
The EU’s approach forces market participants to publish climate
information, thereby facilitating “private climate governance,” relying on
investors and market forces to reallocate their capital.17 This paper focusses
on the sector that verifies and simplifies this non-financial climate
information. Special attention is paid to the emergence and role of ESG
Rating Agencies. The ESG Rating Agencies have received substantial
criticism.18 However, like Credit Rating Agencies (“CRAs”) with respect
to credit worthiness, these ESG Rating Agencies play a crucial role in
financial markets, particularly concerning “green credentials,” or
sustainability of firms. This role will provide them with a potentially
significant impact on the success of the EU’s climate policy. This paper,
therefore, examines ESG Rating Agencies’ role and influence. The paper
concludes with policy recommendations on how to manage any potential
risks.
This paper proceeds as follows: first, it sets out the relevant details of
the EU’s policy agenda on enhancing private investments in sustainable
activities through market efficiency and increased disclosure of nonfinancial information. Second, the most important legislative initiatives for
non-financial information disclosure are briefly examined. Third, the
verifiers of non-financial information, particularly the (relatively) new and
increasingly important ESG Rating Agencies, are studied. Fourth, we look

16. Thomas Dyllick & Katrin Muff, Clarifying the Meaning of Sustainable Business:
Introducing a Typology from Business-as-Usual to True Business Sustainability, 29 ORG. &
ENV’T 156, 157–159 (2016) (noting that the increased acceptance and integration of
sustainability by big companies has not translated into a realized change in the state of the
planet).
17. Banda, supra note 7, at 389.
18. See Chris Flood, SEC Chair Warns of Risks Tied to ESG Ratings, FIN. TIMES
(May 27, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/2c662135-4fd3-4c1b-9597-2c6f8f17faed;
Timothy M. Doyle, Ratings That Don’t Rate: The Subjective World of ESG Rating Agencies,
AM. COUNCIL FOR CAP. FORMATION (July 2018), https://perma.cc/P4NW-2Q74; Cam
Simpson et al., The ESG Mirage, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Dec. 10, 2021),
https://perma.cc/E6QZ-7ECY.
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at their methodology and impact in the financial markets. Finally, policy
implications for the regulation of ESG information verifiers and the EU’s
Green Policy are discussed. The main focus of this paper is on the EU’s
climate policy; however, it is fair to say that the U.S. has recently taken
steps in the same direction.19 Since his inauguration, U.S. President Joe
Biden has (re-)committed the U.S. to tackling the climate crisis.20
Moreover, the Biden-Harris Administration has set out to improve the
disclosure of financial information relating to climate risk.21 This paper will
venture into the situation in the U.S. when appropriate.

I. ENABLING A MARKET FOR SUSTAINABLE
INVESTMENTS
A. USING MARKET EFFICIENCY AS PART OF THE EU GREEN
POLICY
The European Green Deal can be described as a macro-economic
growth plan that sets out pathways of transformation, founded on a deal
between the EU, the Member States, and their citizens.22 It is not a
coincidence that this document has received the title “Green Deal,” a name
which strongly resembles the U.S. “New Deal” of the 1930’s, in the sense
that both signify progress and change in economic policy.23 In essence, the
Green Deal spells out a number of reallocation mechanisms within the
European economy which should bring about the shift to a climate-neutral
Europe.24 In the past, climate action has often been characterized as
antithetical to economic growth25, but the European Green Deal frames the

19. See generally Tom Daschle, Changing the Political Climate on Climate Change,
9 GEO. J. INT’L AFFS. 93 (2008) (providing an overview of US interests and a call to action
for the U.S. to address climate change).
20. Exec. Order No. 14008, 86 Fed. Reg. 7619 (Jan. 27, 2021); See generally, e.g.,
Cass R. Sunstein, Changing Climate Change, 2008–2016, 42 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 231
(2018) (detailing the previous efforts, in particular by the executive branch, under the
Obama-administration); Shany Winder, Extraordinary Policymaking Powers of the
Executive Branch: A New Approach, 37 VA. ENV’T L.J. 208 (2019).
21. Exec. Order No. 14040, 86 Fed. Reg. 27867 (May 20, 2021); See generally Colin
Myers, Financing Our Future’s Health: Why the United States Must Establish Mandatory
Climate-Related Financial Disclosure Requirements Aligned with the TCFD
Recommendations, 37 PACE ENV’T L. REV. 415, 433–439 (2020) (considering the US
adoption of a regime for climate related financial disclosures).
22. Eigil Hodne, The European Green Deal—A Norwegian Perspective, 9 EEJ 18,
19 (2020).
23. Ludwig Krämer, Planning for Climate and the Environment: the EU Green Deal,
17 (3) J. FOR EUR. ENV’T & PLAN. L. 267, 269 (2020).
24. See generally Grégory Claeys et al., How To Make the European Green Deal
work, 13 BRUEGEL POL’Y CONTRIBUTION, 1, 2 (2019).
25. Mark Landler & Somini Sengupta, Trump and the Teenager: A Climate
Showdown at Davos, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2020), https://perma.cc/HW4G-7E2F (reporting
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transition as an opportunity for socio-economic progress.26 Reframing an
ambition which prima facie has little to do with economic growth into a
market stimulus, a strategy commonly employed by the EU.27 The most
well-known example is the early predecessor of the EU, the European Coal
and Steel Community, which successfully transformed the agenda of
preventing wars by controlling commodities into a welfare project which
proved essential for rebuilding the European economy.28
The financing element of the Green Deal is set out in the Sustainable
Europe Investment Plan.29 The idea is to stimulate the allocation of funds,
including private sector funds30, to those firms and projects that are
facilitating the transition towards a climate-neutral Europe. Specific policy
actions are set out in the Action Plan on financing sustainable growth,
which sets out ten initiatives that should contribute to closing the current
annual investment gap of EUR 350 billion in sustainable financing.31 The
mechanics applied in the EU’s Green Policy to achieve this (re)allocation
appear simple and are derived from other related fields of finance and
financial markets.
Based on the notions of transparency and disclosure driving a form of
market discipline and accountability, the mechanics introduced by the
Action Plan aim to increase the transparency and disclosure regarding the
sustainability risks and impacts of investments. According to the efficientmarket hypothesis (“EMH”), the price of a product reflects all information

on critics from the corporate world stating they have been unable to combine economic
growth, based on gross domestic product, with keeping carbon emissions in check).
26. The European Green Deal, Dec. 11, 2019, COM(2019) 640 final, 7; see Ten Facts
About the Economics of Climate Change and Climate Policy, HAMILTON PROJECT &
STANFORD INST. FOR ECON. POL’Y RES. (Oct. 2019), https://perma.cc/L56P-JYL6 (it appears
however more widely recognized that climate change in itself will have a negative economic
impact).
27. Joaquín Roy, All Roads Lead to Rome: Background, Context and Legacy of the
Treaty on the European Community, JEAN MONNET/ROBERT SCHUMAN PAPER SERIES
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 3 (Aug. 2012); Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration: An
Introduction, in THE EUROPEAN UNION—READING ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, 125–37 (Brent F. Nelsen & Alexander C-G. Stubb eds., 1994).
28. Id.
29. European Green Deal Investment Plan, Jan. 1, 2020, COM(2020) 21 final, §§ 2–
4.
30. Id. at §§ 1, 4.
31. Renewed Sustainable Finance Strategy and Implementation of the Action Plan
on Financing Sustainable Growth, EUR. COMM’N (Mar. 8, 2018), https://perma.cc/89RDKHY9; Action Plan: Financing Sustainable Growth, Mar. 8, 2018, annex 3, COM(2018) 97
final (Workplan of the initiatives set out by this Action Plan); Financing the Green
Transition: The European Green Deal Investment Plan and Just Transition Mechanism,
EUR. COMM’N (Jan 14, 2020), https://perma.cc/8CQ4-8ASL; Strategy for Financing the
Transition to a Sustainable Economy, EUR. COMM’N (July 6, 2021).
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available on that product. 32 A market is said to be efficient if prices reflect all
the information available. Without access to all information, potential investors
suffer from the adverse selection problem, also known as the “lemon problem.” 33
This problem arises when not all information is available to the buyer, who would
then be unwilling to pay more than the average price for a certain product. This
would be a disadvantage for some selling a premium (and more expensive)
product, but a benefit to those selling “lemons.” In other words, if buyers lack
reliable information, they cannot properly assess the value of the product, which
frustrates efficient price formation. 34 In the situation where prices do not reflect
the value of the product, this is mostly to the detriment of those offering higher
quality (value) products: quality issuers and securities are driven away from the
market.35 In the context of the aim to increase sustainable investments, sustainable
issuers are at risk of being driven out of the market because their products are
indistinguishable from non-sustainable products due to a lack of information for
the investor. One solution is to create regulation that forces the disclosure of certain
information, thereby removing (or at least reducing) the information asymmetry.
By forcing market participants to create and make public information on their
sustainability risks and impacts, the EU aims to negate the current information
asymmetries.36 The idea seems to be that with information on sustainability
available to the market proper price formation can take place, leading to the
allocation of capital to more sustainable projects.37

32. Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970) (“A market in which prices always ‘fully reflect’ available
information is called ‘efficient.’”); See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman,
The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984) (further discussing the
Efficient Market Theory); See also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms
of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 718
(2003); but see, e.g., Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics,
17(1) J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 59, 80 (2003) (criticizing the Efficient Market Theory);
Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient
Markets, 70 AMER. ECON. REV. 393, 403–05 (1980).
33. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 488–92 (1970) (using the automobile market to
analogize the negative effect of market uncertainty).
34. Id. at 489–90 (explaining that good cars and bad cars must be trading at the same
price as the buyer, who has less information than the seller, cannot tell the difference).
35. Id. at 489–90 (explaining that most cars traded will be ‘lemons’ driving out the
good, because they would trade at the same price); Dan S. Dhaliwal et al., Voluntary
Nonfinancial Disclosure and the Cost of Equity Capital: The Initiation of Corporate Social
Responsibility Reporting, 86 ACCOUNTING REV. 59 (2011) (finding that initiating corporate
social responsibility information disclosure reduces the cost of capital compared with
previous years of non-disclosure).
36. E.g., Sanjay Ramchande et al., The Informational Relevance of Corporate Social
Responsibility: Evidence from DS400 Index Reconstitutions, 33 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 303
(2012) Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.(finding that information published on
corporate social responsibility influences price formation as the information has a positive
or negative effect on the share price).
37. Jin Boon Wong & Qin Zhang, Stock Market Reactions To Adverse ESG
Disclosure Via Media Channels, 54 BRITISH ACCOUNTING REV. 1, 4 (2022) (explaining the
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In the present context, one should consider whether the price is also a
reflection of all non-financial sustainable information available, as this
presumption appears to be a prerequisite for the EU’s policy to work.
Various research indicates that a combination of financial and non-financial
information, particularly ESG information, contributes to the price
formation process.38 In U.S. markets, it has been shown that ESG disclosure
in general for U.S. S&P 500-listed companies between 2009 and 2018
positively affected those firms’ performance measures, such as return-onequity.39 The same research also shows, however, that looking at the
different ESG components provides a more subtle picture: CSR and
environmental disclosure has a negative relation to Return on Assets, whilst
corporate governance disclosure has a positive relation. Research from
Chinese capital markets shows that, for listed companies, disclosure of
environmental information can significantly improve the value of the
company through significant positive correlation with investor
confidence.40 Research for German listed companies between 2010 and
2014 shows that ESG has a positive impact on Return on Assets, and that
governance has a stronger impact than environmental and social factors.41
Other research does not focus on specific jurisdictions but on industry
sectors. For the food and beverage industry, it has been shown that access
to financial resources, such as equity, improves with ESG disclosure. 42
Likewise, ESG disclosure has an impact on performance of European banks
with individual elements of this disclosure having slightly different forms
of influence.43

link between signaling theory and corporate reputation emerging from corporate social
responsibility, and the importance of corporate social responsibility information in reducing
information asymmetry and price formation).
38. Eli Amir & Baruch Lev, Value-Relevance of Nonfinancial Information: The
Wireless Communications Industry, 22 J. ACCT. ECON. 3, 4 (1996).
39. E.g., Bahaaeddin Ahmed Alareeni & Allam Hamdan, ESG Impact on
Performance of US S&P 500-Listed Firms, 20 CORP. GOV. 1409, 1422 (2020); Yannik
Bofinger et al., Corporate Social Responsibility & Market Efficiency: Evidence from ESG
and Misvaluation Measures, 134 J. BANKING & FIN. 1, 17 (2022) (suggesting that a firm’s
ESG profile reduces undervaluation but may expand overvaluation).
40. T.M. Yuang, Does Environmental Information Disclosure Increase the Firm
Value and Investors’ Confidence?, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 614 (L. Zhu & A.
Ouadha eds., 2016).
41. P. Velte, Does ESG Performance Have an Impact on Financial Performance?
Evidence from Germany, 8 J. GLOB. RESP. 169, 176 (2017).
42. N. Raimo et al., Non-Financial Information and Cost of Equity Capital: An
Empirical Analysis in the Food and Beverage Industry, 123 BRIT. FOOD J. 49, 58 (2020).
43. A. Buallay, Is Sustainability Reporting (ESG) Associated with Performance?
Evidence from the European Banking Sector, 30 MGMT. OF ENV’T QUALITY 98, 111 (2019)
(finding that, individually, the environmental disclosure positively affected ROA and TQ,
whereas the corporate social responsibility disclosure negatively affected ROA, ROE, and
TQ).
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This overview demonstrates the impact of non-financial, and in
particularly ESG, information on the price formation process. Policy to
provide market participants with comparable, non-financial information
should therefore enable a market-based solution by way of market
efficiency. If this policy indeed leads to a reallocation of capital toward
sustainable projects, it could ultimately allow the EU to reach the agreed
climate targets under the Paris Agreement. The next section discusses why
the integrity, availability, and comparability of this non-financial
information are essential.44

B. THE IMPORTANCE OF INFORMATION AND ITS INTEGRITY,
AVAILABILITY, AND COMPARABILITY
The existence and availability of information is necessary for an
efficient market, but unfortunately is not a given in the current financial
markets. The first point to make is that non-disclosure of relevant
information will lead to information asymmetries between the issuers of
securities and potential buyers. The issuer, or seller, holds more nonfinancial information than the buyer, which, as discussed previously, leads
to the “lemon problem,” which in turn drives high quality issuers and
securities away.45 There are ways of overcoming difficulties caused by
asymmetries, for example, by the knowledgeable party “signaling” its
credentials.46 In financial markets, issuers (or owners) can signal their
credentials by retaining a significant percentage during an initial public
offering, which would be too costly if they were a poorly performing
company.47 Another solution is to create regulation which forces the
disclosure of certain information, thereby removing (or at least reducing)
the information asymmetry. This is the approach taken in Europe’s Green
Policy.
Before setting out the key legislative elements of the Green Policy,
one must consider another issue: the integrity and fairness of the price
formation process. Such integrity and fairness in markets are core
objectives of securities regulation, yet they are not necessarily trivial to
define, and may depend on whether one refers to assumptions in the EMH
or to the International Organization of Securities Commissions’ (“IOSCO”)
regulatory principles.48 Some of the common requirements for integrity and
fairness are likely to include: absence of market abuse; non-discriminatory

44. See generally Becky L. Jacobs & Brad Finney, Defining Sustainable Business—
Beyond Greenwashing, 37 VA. ENV’T L.J. 90 (2019).
45. Akerlof, supra note 33, at 488.
46. See generally Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q. J. ECON. 355 (1973).
47. See Hayne E. Leland & David H. Pyle, Informational Asymmetries, Financial
Structure, and Financial Intermediation, 32 J. FIN. 371, 371–72 (1977).
48. Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’n, Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation,
Res. 2/2017 (May 2017).
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access to the market for participants; transparent and accurate information
about the prices of securities available to all participants at the same time;
and accurate information about the issuers of securities available to all
participants at the same time.49 The first three requirements are rather
general, but the last one is particularly relevant in the present context: all
market participants need to have the same timely access to accurate
information with a material impact on the price of a security. Having
previously discussed the material impact of ESG disclosure on price, the
remaining key element here is having the same, timely, and accurate
information available.
Finally, one needs to contemplate the issue of comparability.
Generally speaking, the price for a particular financial instrument depends
on the expected future return on the investment. In the present context, the
“sustainability” associated with this instrument also becomes a key
component. For market participants to make an investment choice, this nonfinancial information must not only be available in a timely and accurate
manner, but it must be available in an intelligible and standardized form,
allowing for the easy comparison between these investment choices. 50 Put
simply, if it is too difficult for market participants to assess and compare
potential investment opportunities based on the disclosed non-financial
information, then publishing the information in the first place was to no
avail.

C. CRITICISM AND HURDLES
It should be noted that despite the arguments presented above, a
market-based approach is not without its critics. Even generally speaking,
the debate regarding which policy instruments are most suited to tackling
climate change is ongoing.51 A fundamental question raised by some is
whether the market-based idea that disclosure leads to solving the ESG
problems is actually going to work. 52 Is the basic assumption that in an
efficient market investors will invest more sustainably, correct? Some
authors appear to argue in favour, explaining that creating these “green
light” signals will help investors reallocate their funds to sustainable
companies, rather than the usual “red light” signals which merely flag

49. Janet Austin, What Exactly Is Market Integrity? An Analysis of One of the Core
Objectives of Securities Regulation, 8 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 215, 240 (2017).
50. JOHN ARMOUR ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 102 (2016).
51. See William Boyd, The Poverty of Theory: Public Problems, Instrument Choice,
and the Climate Emergency, 46 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 399, 400–01 (2021); See generally Eric
L. Lane, Greenwashing 2.0, 38 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 279 (2013).
52. See B. Christophers, Climate Change and Financial Instability: Risk Disclosure
and the Problematics of Neoliberal Governance, 107 ANNALS AM. ASS’N GEOGRAPHERS,
1108, 1118–24 (2017).
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which companies not to invest in.53 Other research suggests that “enabling”
ESG regulation may not be sufficient to create, let alone force, the radical
change of investment behaviour which is envisaged.54 Chiu suggests
instead that a wider set of reforms, like those following the Great Financial
Crisis, is warranted.55 It has further been suggested that a paradigm shift in
shareholder thinking is required, with shareholder activists stimulating the
entire market to consider long-term value creation.56
Besides this fundamental criticism, there are other hurdles such as
greenwashing. Greenwashing is the practice of misleading investors or
consumers with regards to the sustainable or green credentials of the entire
firm or some of its products.57 As per the previous section, the integrity of
non-financial information is paramount to the functioning of an efficient
market. Thus, the notion of greenwashing has the potential to seriously
undermine the foundations on which the EU’s Green Policy framework is
built. That raises the question: why is greenwashing taking place? Delmas
and Burbano set out a useful framework, in The Drivers of Greenwashing,
to examine a variety of factors which may lead to a firm greenwashing. 58
The framework consists of four elements: (1) market external drivers such
as consumers, investors, or competition, where a brown firm may want to
present itself as more green to meet consumer demands or follow its
competitors in positive green messaging; (2) non-market external drivers
such as NGOs, activists, the media, or a lax regulatory environment, where
official regulation and oversight is limited and reliant mostly on activist or
NGO-led campaigns; (3) organizational internal drivers, such as its
industry sector, the cost-benefit within the firm, or the incentive structure
and ethical climate; and (4) finally, individual drivers, such as the personal
ideas and tone from senior management.
Perhaps not surprisingly, Delmas and Burbano recommend
decreasing the risk of greenwashing by, amongst others, increasing
transparency of environmental performance. This would include extended
mandated disclosure as well as independent verification (e.g., by the
policymakers possibly in collaboration with NGOs). Other research shows

53. Daniel C. Esty & Quentin Karpilow, Harnessing Investor Interest in
Sustainability: The Next Frontier in Environmental Information Regulation, 36 YALE J.
REG. 625, 628–29 (2019).
54. Iris Y. Chiu, Regulating Sustainable Finance in Capital Markets: A Perspective
from Socially Embedded Decentered Regulation, 84 L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 78–79 (2021).
55. Id. at 78–79.
56. Alexander T. Kraik, Environmental, Social, and Governance Issues: An Altered
Shareholder Activist Paradigm, 44 VT. L. REV. 493, 545–46 (2020).
57. William S. Laufer, Social Accountability and Corporate Greenwashing, 43 J.
BUS. ETHICS 253, 253 (2003).
58. Magali A. Delmas & Vanessa Cuerel Burbano, The Drivers of Greenwashing, 54
CAL. MGMT. REV. 64, 65 (2011).
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that sustainability ratings could deter greenwashing.59 These observations
support the line of thinking put forward in this paper: the EU Green Policy
mandates a substantial increase in the disclosure of non-financial
information, which would be independently verified by ESG Rating
Agencies. Following the Delmas and Burbano framework would likely
reduce the risk of greenwashing. This, in turn, would improve the integrity
of the non-financial information and enable the market efficiency approach.

II. THE DISCLOSURE OF NON-FINANCIAL
INFORMATION
To create an efficient market where investors invest more sustainably,
the EU is expanding the obligation to disclose non-financial information.
There are three main pillars enhancing the general availability of
sustainability information:60 the Non-Financial Reporting Directive
(“NFRD”)61 together with the proposed Corporate Sustainability Reporting
Directive (“Proposed CSRD”)62, the Taxonomy Regulation63, and the
Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (“SFDR”).64 These form an
overarching, cross-sectoral framework that focusses on ESG-related
measures. In addition, the EU is designing specific, sectoral information
with a more limited focus, such as the proposed European Green Bond

59. Beatrice Parguel et al., How Sustainability Ratings Might Deter
“Greenwashing”: A Closer Look at Ethical Corporate Communication, 102 J. BUS. ETHICS
15, 23–24 (2011).
60. See Ohnesorge & Rogge, supra note 13, at 36–37; see generally Javier El-Hage,
Fixing ESG: Are Mandatory ESG Disclosures the Solution to Misleading ESG Ratings?, 26
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 359 (2021) (discussing ESG disclosures in the U.S.).
61. Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22
October 2014: Amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and
diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups, OFFICIAL J. OF THE E.U.
330/1 (Nov. 15, 2014), https://perma.cc/6DAX-XAJ2 [hereinafter NFRD].
62. European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and
of the Council amending Directive 2013/34/EU, Directive 2004/109/EC, Directive
2006/43/EC and Regulation (EU) No 537/2014, as regards corporate sustainability
reporting, COM(2021) 189 final, https://perma.cc/JR25-VCTC [hereinafter Proposed
CSRD].
63. Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18
June 2020 on the establishment of a framework to facilitate sustainable investment, and
amending Regulation (EU) 2019/2088, OFF. J. E.U. 198/13 (June 22, 2020)
https://perma.cc/PU4U-G3LU [hereinafter Taxonomy Regulation].
64. Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27
Nov 2019 on sustainability‐related disclosures in the financial services sector, OFF. J. E.U.
317/1 (Dec. 9, 2019), https://perma.cc/4CWE-GTT2 [hereinafter SFDR].
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Standard.65 Put simply, the NFRD (and Proposed CSRD) will require
companies to make their ESG information public. The SFDR subsequently
requires financial market participants and financial advisers to provide
information on the integration of the sustainable and environmental impact
of their investments in the aforementioned companies, which is facilitated
by the information made available under the NFRD. The Taxonomy
Regulation contains a classification system for sustainable information,
allowing the aforementioned disclosed data to be analyzed and compared.
In other words, by creating a “common language,” the Taxonomy
Regulation enables the effective use of the information made available
under the NFRD and Proposed CSRD by owners, financial market
participants, and advisors who have to disclose information under the
SFDR. This overarching framework of transparency requirements should
contribute to the production and accessibility of sustainable information
that is necessary for a functioning market in sustainable finance to emerge.

A. CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING DIRECTIVE
In 2014, the first pillar of enhancing the general availability of
sustainability information, the NFRD was adopted.66 The NFRD amends
the Accounting Directive by inter alia introducing Article 19a, which
requires “large undertakings that are public interest entities with more than
500 employees” to disclose information about “environmental, social and
employee matters, respect for human rights, [and] anti-corruption and
bribery matters”.67 Taking into account how it was transposed into national
law, the NFRD applies to approximately 11,700 companies.68
More information provided by companies about their sustainability
impacts is necessary to enable the transparency and disclosure required for
an efficient market for sustainable finance to function. The NFRD,
however, does not provide a framework that sufficiently generates such
information.69 Many companies fall outside its scope, and information is
not sufficiently reliable and comparable, possibly resulting in

65. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Establishment of an EU Green Bond Standard, Document Ares(2020)3052805,
https://perma.cc/D3DJ-6S54.
66. NFRD, supra note 61.
67. Id., inserting Article 19a(1) into Directive 2013/34/EU on the annual financial
statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of
undertakings, OFF. J. E.U. 182/19 (June 29, 2013), https://perma.cc/D998-YE67.
68. European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and
of the Council amending Directive 2013/34/EU, Directive 2004/109/EC, Directive
2006/43/EC and Regulation (EU) No 537/2014, as regards corporate sustainability
reporting, COM(2021) 189 final, https://perma.cc/J7YP-UG92.
69. NFRD, supra note 61.
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greenwashing.70 In order to reduce the lack of precision in the current
environmental reporting requirement, non-binding guidelines were drawn
up in 2017 and 2019, providing more details on drawing up non-financial
statements than the NFRD.71 The 2019 guidelines specifically address
climate-related information, integrating the recommendations made by the
Financial Stability Board’s Task Force on Climate-Related Financial
Disclosures.72 It appears that these guidelines, possibly due to their
voluntary nature, did not have a significant effect on the quality of nonfinancial reporting.73
In light of the shortcomings of the NFRD, the European Commission
has adopted a proposal for a Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive,
the Proposed CSRD, which would amend the current reporting
framework.74 It would extend the scope of companies that have to report,
whilst differentiating between the size of companies in order to keep
reporting requirements proportional. For example, even small and mediumsized companies will have to include information about their impact on
sustainability in their management reports.75 Moreover, the Proposed
CSRD would contain more detailed requirements on the information that
needs to be reported, including the requirement to report in line with EU
sustainability reporting standards. Moreover, information would have to be
published as part of management reports and disclosed in a digital,
machine-readable format, increasing the accessibility.76

B. TAXONOMY REGULATION
The notion of common standards also leads to the second pillar of
enhancing the general availability of sustainability information, the
Taxonomy Regulation.77 The Taxonomy Regulation defines a wide range
of ESG related matters: Article 3 of the Taxonomy Regulation defines what
economic activity will be considered as environmentally sustainable,
namely when it actively contributes to one or more of the environmental
70. See, e.g., Deirdre Ahern, Turning Up the Heat? EU Sustainability Goals and the
Role of Reporting under the Non-Financial Reporting Directive, 13 EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV.
599 (2016); M.A. DELMAS & D COLGAN, THE GREEN BUNDLE: PARING THE MARKET WITH
THE PLANET 170–194 (2018).
71. Communication from the Commission: Guidelines on non-financial reporting
(methodology for reporting non-financial information), (2017/C 215/01) OFF. J. E.U. (July
5, 2017), https://perma.cc/Z7JP-DW98.
72. Communication from the Commission: Guidelines on non-financial reporting:
supplement on reporting climate-related information (2019/C 209/01) OFFICIAL J. OF THE
E.U. (June 20, 2019), https://perma.cc/PVD3-JUWJ [hereinafter Guidelines on nonfinancial reporting].
73. Proposed CSRD, supra note 62, at Recital 32.
74. Proposed CSRD, supra note 62.
75. Guidelines on non-financial reporting, supra note 72.
76. Proposed CSRD, supra note 62, at Recital 48–49.
77. Taxonomy Regulation, supra note 63.
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objectives.78 The environmental objectives are set out in Article 9 of the
Taxonomy Regulation and include climate change mitigation and
adaptation, and the protection of ecosystems.79 Article 10 of the Taxonomy
Regulation also specifies what is meant by contributing substantially to
climate change mitigation, thus providing a “common language” on an
ESG matter.80 This enhances the comparability, reliability, and consistency
of sustainability related information in financial markets, especially,
because the obligations under the Taxonomy Regulation are explicitly
linked to the NFRD81 and the SFDR.82 In particular, Article 5 of the
Taxonomy Regulation83 prescribes that, if information on financial
products is disclosed based on Article 6 of the SFDR84, then the disclosure
must include information on the environmental objective(s) set out in
Article 9 of the Taxonomy Regulation.85 By explicitly expanding the
obligations of the NFRD and SFDR, the Taxonomy Regulation creates a
cohesive framework integrating all three pieces of legislation. It is expected
that the European Supervisory Authorities (“ESA”) will publish a
consultation on taxonomy-related product disclosures under the Taxonomy
Regulation which would increase the interaction between the instruments
even more, by amending the empowerments provided for under Articles
8(4), 9(6) and 11(5) of the SFDR.86 Because the Taxonomy Regulation is
an EU Regulation rather than an EU Directive, it is aimed at creating
uniformity amongst EU Member States by removing the need for
transposition in national law, allowing all market participants in the EU to
determine uniformly what is sustainable.87 This in turn reduces risks of
greenwashing and other similar activities which would undermine
confidence in non-financial information.
The Taxonomy Regulation applies to both financial market
participants that make available financial products, linking it to the SFDR,

78. Id. at Article 3.
79. Id. at Article 9.
80. Id. at Article 10.
81. NFRD, supra note 61.
82. SFDR, supra note 64.
83. Taxonomy Regulation, supra note 63, at Article 5.
84. SFDR, supra note 64, at Article 6.
85. Taxonomy Regulation, supra note 63, at Article 9.
86. The Three European Supervisory Authorities publish Final Report and Draft RTS
on Disclosures Under SFDR, EUR. SECS. & MKTS. AUTH. (Feb. 4, 2021),
https://perma.cc/K7M4-YMHG.
87. Russell Sparkes, Ethical Investment: Whose Ethics, Which Investment?, 10 BUS.
ETHICS, ENV’T & RESP. 199–200 (2008); Georg Inderst et al., Defining and Measuring Green
Investments, OECD WORKING PAPERS ON FINANCE INSURANCE AND PRIVATE PENSIONS NO
24, 13–14 (2012), https://perma.cc/532W-WBWD; Anastasia O’Rourke, The Message and
Methods of Ethical Investment, 11(6) J. CLEANER PROD. 683, 684–685 (2003).
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and to undertakings that are subject to Article 19(a) of the NFRD. 88 The
Taxonomy Regulation thus provides the necessary definitions and
categorizations in which information can be made available under both
statutes, increasing the comparability of financial products with a
sustainability aspect. Generally speaking, the price for a particular financial
product depends on the expected future return on the investment. In the
present context, the “sustainability” associated with the product also
becomes a key component. For market participants to make an investment
choice, non-financial information must not only be available in a timely
and accurate manner, but it must be available in an intelligible and
standardized form, allowing for the easy comparison between investment
choices.89 The Taxonomy Regulation intends to ensure reliability,
consistency, and comparability of sustainability-related disclosures in the
financial services sector.90

C. SUSTAINABLE FINANCE DISCLOSURE REGULATION
The third and final pillar of enhancing the general availability of
sustainability information is the SFDR, most of which came into force on
March 10, 2021.91 Essentially, the SFDR obligates those who fall under its
reach to disclose information on the integration of sustainability risks and
impacts in their investment decisions and advice, and sustainability-related
information with respect to financial products.92 The SFDR applies to
financial market participants and financial advisers, defined broadly in
Article 2 of the SFDR.93 Disclosure obligations include publishing
information about the integration of sustainability risks in the decisionmaking processes on a company’s website under Article 3 of the SFDR 94
and the pre-contractual disclosure obligation to describe how sustainability
risks are integrated into investment decisions as per Article 6 of the
SFDR.95 The latter obligation in Article 6 of the SFDR is refined and
expanded upon in subsequent articles, notably in Article 7 of the SFDR,
relating to the transparency of sustainability impacts on a financial product
level.96 It is important to note that the SFDR, though applicable across the
financial sector, has an element of voluntariness. Firstly, numerous
88. Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18
June 2020 on the establishment of a framework to facilitate sustainable investment, and
amending Regulation (EU) 2019/2088, OFF. J. E.U. 198/13, Art. 1 (June 22, 2020),
https://perma.cc/5BQL-D754.
89. Armour et al., supra note 50, at 102.
90. Taxonomy Regulation, supra note 63, at Preamble 20.
91. SFDR, supra note 64.
92. Id. at Preamble 10, Article 1.
93. Id. at Article 2.
94. Id. at Article 3.
95. Id. at Article 6.
96. Id. at Article 6–7.
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obligations are of a “comply or explain” nature: for example, Article 4
contains the obligation to publish adverse sustainability impacts on
websites at entity level, but also contains the option to comply by stating
on the website clear reasons for why the company does not take such
impacts into account.97 Secondly, some obligations only apply in case the
financial product promotes environmental or other sustainability-related
characteristics (notably, Articles 8, 9, 10, and 11 of the SFDR). 98 This
means that for products which are not clearcut climate friendly, there are
less obligations to be transparent about adverse impacts. One question this
raises is whether the increased regulatory burden regarding “green”
products could have the counter-effect of discouraging companies to go
green.
As already mentioned, the transparency requirements of the SFDR are
intimately linked to the reporting standards set out in the Taxonomy
Regulation, which refers to and amends the SFDR. The Taxonomy
Regulation contains the format for the reporting requirements laid down in
the SFDR. The SFDR leaves quite some operational details to be elaborated
and specified in future Regulatory Technical Standards.99

III. VERIFICATION OF NEW NON-FINANCIAL
INFORMATION
A. CREDIT RATING AGENCIES
The previous sections set out the mechanisms behind the EU’s Green
Policy: how disclosure of the relevant non-financial, sustainability-related
information would, by way of market efficiency, lead to the allocation of
capital towards sustainable projects and companies. Thus, the key is the
disclosure of the necessary information, for which various legislative
initiatives are taken. What remains is the verification of (this) information,
so that market participants can trust the information and rely upon it in their
decision making. This section examines some of the traditional verifiers of
information in financial markets, as well as new entrants to the market. In
discussing these verifiers, in particular the traditional ones with a long
history, it is necessary to reflect on some of the issues and challenges they
faced over the last few decades. That is not to say that they are necessarily
unreliable or inadequate; the point is that past failures should not be
repeated in this new context.
One of the traditional verifiers of information are the numerous Credit
Rating Agencies (“CRAs”). These companies examine financial
97. Id. at Article 4.
98. Id. at Articles 8–11.
99. Joint Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities, Joint Consultation
Paper—ESG Disclosures, EUR. SECS. & MKTS. AUTH. (Apr. 23, 2020),
https://perma.cc/5WYS-9CN2.
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information of other companies in order to assess their ability to repay debt
in a timely manner. In accordance with their assessment, CRAs assign a
particular credit rating to such a company, signifying its credit worthiness.
For example, a company that is highly likely to make its debt payments in
a timely fashion might receive an “AA”-rating, whilst one that is less credit
worthy may receive a “BB”-rating. There are two functions traditionally
associated with CRAs: (1) correcting the issue of information asymmetry
between debt issuers and buyers; and (2) a regulatory role with regard to
the rated investments.100 In the first function, CRAs play the role of
information intermediary, reducing or negating the information asymmetry
by assigning ratings to issuers and issuances.101 This is not without its
critics; the assignment of a rating, as sometimes argued, may not involve
much more than analyzing publicly available information.102 If that were
indeed the case, then such ratings would do little to reduce the asymmetry
of information. One could also question why such ratings are issued for
bonds (i.e., debt instruments), but not for other financial instruments such
as shares.
In the second function, it is argued that CRAs fulfill a certain
regulatory role by assigning a rating. The sell-side, for example in the form
of brokers, signals the creditworthiness of the issuer and the particular
issuance to the buy-side, such as investment managers or banks.103 The
regulatory role becomes explicit when this creditworthiness is subsequently
used in the calculation of the capital requirements for the buyer. This
reliance creates a number of concerns:104 the reputation and authority of
major CRAs become a guarantor for the accurate measurement of risk and
amount of capital required to hold; and this authority may create, amongst
other things, a significant reliability on such agencies, as well as potential
conflicts of interests between issuers, or the sell-side, and the agencies.
The question arises whether one should be comfortable with these
roles, particularly the second function: are CRAs sufficiently equipped to
perform these important roles? For example, the role of CRAs in the Global
Financial Crisis of 2008 has been well documented.105 The focus on their

100. Robert J Rhee, Why Credit Rating Agencies Exist, 44 ECON. NOTES 161, 163–
66 (2015).
101. A.W.A. Boot, T.T. Milbourn & A. Schmeits, Credit Ratings as Coordinated
Mechanisms, 19 REV. FIN. STUD. 81, 84–85 (2006).
102. Rhee, supra note 100, at 163.
103. See Gilson & Kraakman, Mechanisms of Market Efficiency (1984) supra note
32, at 604–605 (regarding the role of CRAs in signaling).
104. Mia Mahmudur Rahim, Credit Rating Agencies’ Roles Have To Be Reassessed,
4 L. & FIN. MKT. REV. 433, 434 (2010).
105. See generally US FINANCIAL CRISIS COMMISSION, The Financial Crisis Inquiry
Report (Jan. 2011), https://perma.cc/7KUC-Z58L; see also Frank Partnoy, Overdependence
on Credit Ratings Was a Primary Cause of the Crisis, U. SAN DIEGO 1, 8–9 n.9–15 (2009);
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role is typically on their high ratings assigned at the time to complex
financial instruments, in particular, to collateralised debt instruments.
There are three broad lines of criticism: the “issuer-pays” model generates
a conflict of interest; the lack of accountability towards the assignment of
ratings; and the agencies’ importance and power in light of their roles.106
The “issuer-pays” model implies that the issuer, who requires a rating for
its product or financial instruments, will pay the CRAs for obtaining a
rating – with the risk that clients may offer higher fees in order to obtain a
better rating. The second point, regarding accountability, refers to the fact
that so far it has been difficult to hold CRAs accountable for, with
hindsight, too favourable ratings. The third point comes back to the
important role played by CRAs regarding regulation. The market at the time
was dominated worldwide by a limited number of players. There were in
effect only three CRAs that mattered: Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and
Fitch.
Since the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, various regulatory
initiatives have sought to address the above concerns, thereby allowing
CRAs to continue to improve their roles.107 It should be noted that there
was already some framework in place, following the collapse of Enron and
WorldCom.108 The main thrust of criticism was that credit ratings of these
firms remained very high until, in practice, everyone already knew they
were about to enter into default. In the U.S., the Credit Rating Agency
Reform Act of 2006 (“CRARA”) was implemented.109 It determines that
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (“NRSROs”) must
register with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), providing
full disclosure on their organization, methods, conflicts of interests, etc.
Whilst the SEC obtained the power to censure an NRSRO, it did not obtain

Martin Mayer, Credit Rating Agencies in the Crosshairs, BROOKINGS (Aug 31, 2010),
https://perma.cc/45FA-N62F.
106. Ryan Voorhees, Rating the Raters: Restoring Confidence and Accountability in
Credit Rating Agencies, 44 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 875, 878 (2012); See generally Lynn
Bai, On Regulating Conflicts of Interest in the Credit Rating Industry, 13 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS.
& PUB. POL’Y 253, 254–70 (2010) (discussing the conflicts of interest that arise in the credit
rating industry).
107. See also A. Kruck, Asymmetry in Empowering and Disempowering Private
Intermediaries: The Case of Credit Rating Agencies, 670 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 133 (2017).
108. Claire A. Hill, Why Did Anyone Listen to the Rating Agencies After Enron?, 4
J. BUS. & TECH. L. 283, 285 (2009) (“since (and as a result of) Enron, the regulatory regime
and the overall climate had changed to make such massive fraud less likely to occur, or at
least less likely to continue to go unnoticed.”); Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating
Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 43, 57–59 (2004); Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to
Worldcom and Beyond: Life and Crime After Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 357, 359
(2003) (citing the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
109. See generally Erin M. Wessendorf, Regulating the Credit Rating Agencies, 3
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 155 (2008).
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any power to regulate the substance of the ratings nor the procedures to
obtain a rating.110 However, as the Great Financial Crisis demonstrated, the
measures taken post-Enron were not sufficient and IOSCO updated its code
for CRAs111, whilst both the U.S. and the EU adopted additional
legislation.112 In the U.S., the Dodd-Frank Act created far greater regulatory
oversight by the SEC, as well as more possibilities for investors to sue
CRAs in case of clearly incorrect ratings.113 In the EU, the Credit Rating
Agency Regulation (2013) preamble (9) clearly states the aim to reduce
overreliance of financial market participants on CRAs and their ratings,
seeking to ensure these participants put in place their own procedures to
make credit risk assessments, including regulatory purposes such as risk
weighting for assets.114 The Credit Rating Agency Regulation (2013) also
establishes rules to reduce conflicts of interests, to ensure high quality and
transparency, to ensure rotation, and to establish direct regulatory oversight
by the European Securities and Markets Authority (“ESMA”). That said,
whilst the above regulations will no doubt address shortcomings
highlighted, it can still be argued that they may not necessarily prevent any
incidents or crisis from happening in the future.115

B. ACCOUNTANCY FIRMS AND OTHER GATEKEEPERS
Whilst the focus of this paper is on the role of ESG rating providers,
there is another traditional group of verifiers of information, the
accountancy firms. Accountancy firms’ main role is auditing financial
information disclosed by companies. The framework in which this work is
carried out has been strengthened over the last decades, at least partly as a
110. Id. at 169.
111. IOSCO, CODE OF CONDUCT FUNDAMENTALS FOR CREDIT RATING AGENCIES:
FINAL REPORT (2015), https://perma.cc/22FT-E5AV.
112. Voorhees, supra note 106, at 878; Nina Dietz Legind & Camilla Horby Jensen,
The European Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies, 30 L. CONTEXT: A SOCIO-LEGAL J.
114, 118–122 (2014).
113. Aline Darbellay & Frank Partnoy, Credit Rating Agencies and Regulatory
Reform, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW (2013) and SAN
DIEGO LEGAL STUDIES PAPER No. 12-082 (2013).
114. Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 16 September 2009 on credit rating agencies (1), amended by Regulation (EU) No
462/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013,
https://perma.cc/DLR4-5829.
115. Voorhees, supra note 106, at 889 (“The international financial system survived
the recent financial crisis, but it may not be able to survive another.”); Legind & Jensen,
supra note 112, at 145 (suggesting that, if the CRA Regulation were enacted before the
financial crisis, it would not have prevented it because the causes were multifactorial. The
author further alleges that the CRA Regulation alone probably will not prevent a future
financial crisis either.); see generally Iris H-Y Chiu, Regulatory Governance of Credit
Rating Agencies in the EU: The Perils of Pursuing the Holy Grail of Rating Accuracy, 4
EUR. J. RISK REG. 209 (2013) (critiquing the EU Regulation of credit rating agencies. In
doing so, the author highlights the difficulty of getting the regulation just right.).
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consequence of various accounting scandals. For example, in the U.S.,
Enron and WorldCom have led to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.116
Around the same time in Europe, in Italy, the Parmalat scandal unfolded –
this concerned a dairy food company that stood at the center of a large
financial fraud.117 A few years later, around 2011, Olympus stood accused
of hiding large losses for many years, one of the largest corporate scandals
in Japan.118 Even more recently, Germany experienced a series of
accounting scandals related to Wirecard, a financial services provider.119
The point of this list, which is of course far from complete, is to
demonstrate clearly the importance of accountancy firms in their role as
gatekeepers.
However, these examples must be seen in light of the question as to
what extent, if any, Credit (and ESG) Rating Agencies are like other
gatekeepers, such as the aforementioned accountancy firms.120 Firstly, not
all gatekeepers are the same, and some authors have argued they all bear
rather different characteristics.121 Some of these gatekeepers, such as
auditors and analysists, could be described as independent and acting for
an unknown audience. Whereas others, including lawyers and underwriters,
could be considered dependent, i.e., acting on behalf of and providing
advice to a known audience – the client. It is suggested that dependent
gatekeepers are more easily influenced or biased, reaching a less robust
recommendation than independent gatekeepers.122 Secondly, various
authors have not merely argued that there are differences amongst
gatekeepers, but that Rating Agencies in particular are unlike any of the
other gatekeepers.123 In short, CRAs “are more profitable than other
gatekeepers, they face different and potentially more serious conflicts of
116. See generally John C. Coffee Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About
Gatekeepers, Stupid”, 57 BUS. LAW. 1403 (2002); Peter T. Muchlinski, Enron and Beyond:
Multinational Corporate Groups and the Internationalization of Governance and
Disclosure Regimes 37 CONN. L. REV. 725, 742 (2005).
117. Guido Ferrarini & Paolo Giudici, Financial Scandals and the Role of Private
Enforcement: The Parmalat Case, ECGI LAW WORKING PAPER No 40/2005 (2005).
118. Bruce E. Aronson, The Olympus Scandal and Corporate Governance Reform:
Can Japan Find a Middle Ground between the Board Monitoring Model and Management
Model?, 30 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 93, 106–114 (2012).
119. ESMA Identifies Deficiencies in German Supervision of Wirecard’s Financial
Reporting, EUR. SECS. & MKTS. AUTH. (Nov. 3, 2020), https://perma.cc/EJ2H-EFW9.
120. Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other
Gatekeepers, San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 07-46, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION PRESS AND
THE NOMURA INSTITUTE OF CAPITAL M ARKETS RESEARCH (Yasuyuki Fuchita &Robert E.
Litan eds. 2006).
121. See generally Arthur B. Laby, Differentiating Gatekeepers, 1 BROOK. J. CORP.
FIN. & COM. L. 119 (2006).
122. Id. at 120.
123. Partnoy, supra note 120; Steven L Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public
Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2002), and Duke Law School,
Public Law Working Paper No. 18 (2001).
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interest, and they are uniquely active in structured finance.”124 This final
point might also be made with regard to ESG Rating Agencies and the
issues observed in the Green Bond industry, which will be discussed later
on. But even if one does not want to go along all the way with these
criticisms of CRAs, it nevertheless must be recognized that, due to the
similarities between the ESG rating industry and the credit rating industry,
ESG Rating Agencies stand out as gatekeepers with specific characteristics
and potential issues. Whilst acknowledging the existence and role of other
gatekeepers in relation to the newly available non-financial information, in
particular, recognizing the role of accountancy firms, it is posited that ESG
Rating Agencies probably play the most important role in potentially
reducing information asymmetry and enabling market efficiency as far as
climate-related information is concerned.

C. THE ESG DATA PROVIDERS INDUSTRY
The aforementioned legislative measures in the EU Green Policy will
create a tremendous amount of new additional non-financial information.
Even if reporting by each individual company is certified by accountancy
firms (the relevant gatekeepers for this purpose as outlined above) there
remains a lot of additional material for investors to gather and digest as part
of their investment process. It has created an industry for data and
information providers. The amount of available information is huge, and
the first issue becomes gathering all the required and necessary
information. Once that is done, it needs to be presented in a comparable
way often accompanied by some form of scoring, scaling, or ranking
methodology. In this section, the ESG services industry is thus pulled apart
in more separate categories, going beyond the mere provision of ratings.
Amongst the ESG services industry are numerous ESG Data
Providers.125 For example, Bloomberg is a traditional provider of
information in financial markets, and, in 2009, it has set up the Bloomberg
ESG Data Service through the acquisition of New Energy Finance.126 They
currently offer ESG data on more than 11,500 companies globally,
standardizing the reported ESG information into consistent and comparable
fields of information.127 Likewise, in 2009 Reuters bought Asset4, one of
the first companies providing raw ESG data to investors.128 This data was
124. Partnoy, supra note 120, at 62.
125. See Betty Moy Huber & Michael Comstock, ESG Reports and Ratings: What
They Are, Why They Matter, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (July 27, 2017),
https://perma.cc/8SK9-FEYE.
126. Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, Bloomberg Buys UK Energy Data Group, FIN.
TIMES (Dec. 10, 2009) (on file with Hastings Environmental Law Journal).
127. Bloomberg Professional Services, Global Environmental, Social & Governance
– ESG Data: Content and Data, https://perma.cc/92HP-USGL.
128. Sophia Grene, Thomson Reuters Buys Governance Data Firm, FIN. TIMES (Nov.
29, 2009) (on file with Hastings Environmental Law Journal).
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made available by way of their Eikon platform, which was transferred to
Refinitiv, currently providing ESG data as a subsidiary of the London Stock
Exchange Group. Like Bloomberg, it claims to provide ESG data for over
10,000 companies across more than seventy-five countries.129 In short, ESG
data is a major industry. In several instances, data providers will combine
offering ESG data with a provision of other services discussed in this paper:
S&P Dow Jones provide ESG indices as well as ESG data,130 whilst
Morgan Stanley Capital International (“MSCI”) provides ESG ratings
based on their ESG data.131

D. THE ESG RATING INDUSTRY
The new legislative measures, along with voluntary disclosure, will
result in a substantial increase in the disclosure of non-financial
information. This large amount of available ESG data raises various issues,
amongst them investor accessibility.132 In the EU, one of the solutions
towards improving the accessibility of ESG data is the creation of a
European Single Access Point (“ESAP”).133 The ESAP is intended to
become a comprehensive data base for both financial and non-financial
company information. One central access point clearly benefits investors,
with the aim of substantially simplifying their investment decision process.
The ESAP facilitates the centralization and accessibility of this data.
However, it is still a complex task to compare and contrast the many
different firms and their reports This can be overcome by relying on ESG
Rating Agencies, which will process the vast amounts of information
provided to the market into an easily digestible and more user-friendly
format.
The problem at hand is a familiar one, a substantial amount of
information about a company (or a set of companies or capital market
instruments) must be transformed into a signal rating or ranking system to
inform potential investors. CRAs have much experience in this field. As
described previously, their business model is based on combining financial
information about a company or product and reducing that to a credit rating
within their credit ranking system. From 2005 onwards, a large amount of
ESG Rating Agencies have appeared and there has been a large amount of

129. Environmental, Social and Corporate Governance—ESG, REFINITIV,
https://perma.cc/Y5BB-EBRQ.
130. S&P DOW JONES, INVESTMENT THEME—S&P DJI ESG SCORES,
https://perma.cc/ZHZ5-R3E2.Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.
131. ESG Ratings, MSCI, https://perma.cc/VP48-HKSW.
132. See generally Sakis Kotsantonis & George Serafeim, Four Things No One Will
Tell You About ESG Data, 31 J. APPLIED CORP. FINANCE 50 (2019).
133. European Commission, Targeted Consultation on the Establishment of a
European Single Access Point (ESAP) for Financial and Non-Financial Information
Publicly Disclosed by Companies, EUR. COMM’N, https://perma.cc/XQ7D-PHGJ.
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consolidation in the sector ever since.134 One of the main reasons for the
increase of ESG Rating Agencies is that ESG Rating Agencies require a
huge scale to have a commercial business model, with consolidation
allowing the larger firms to become market leaders and standard setters.
These developments are set out in more detail in the following section.

IV. THE IMPACT OF ESG RATINGS
A. DIFFERENCES IN ESG RATING PERFORMANCE
The chair of the SEC stated ESG Ratings are “over-inclusive and
imprecise,” whilst researchers at MIT Sloan have described them as
“aggregate confusion.”135 A wide variety and diversity of rating providers
have, despite increased transparency, not provided much added value or
comparability. ESG rating buyers may use it as empty talk or tokenism.
Others point at the failures of ESG rating providers to spot governance
issues at Wirecard136 or to spot social issues and poor working practices at
Boohoo;137 the latter had stellar ratings in a notoriously difficult industry
for sustainability. All of this relates to the underlying issue: what
determines a firm’s ESG rating performance, and how does one get a higher
or lower score?
Many ESG rating agencies have consolidated, thereby gaining
bargaining power. However, regarding their methodology, they appear not
to include sustainability sufficiently, focussing instead on the other
metrics.138 At best, it appears that different ESG Rating Agencies regard
different components as more or less relevant.139 It does appear, however,
that the focus is not on the economic aspects, and truly on the ESG
factors.140 Further, research shows that different ESG rating methodologies
measure risk and performance differently, even within a single category,
134. Emma Avetisyan & Kay Hockerts, The Consolidation of the ESG Rating
Industry as an Enactment of Institutional Retrogression, 26 BUS. STRATEGY & ENV’T 316
(2017).
135. Lucy Fitzgeorge-Parker, What’s Wrong with ESG Ratings?, EUROMONEY
(Sept. 1, 2020), https://perma.cc/N9J9-JEBZ.
136. ESMA, supra note 119; Robert Peres, Wirecard Is a Scar on Germany’s
Corporate Landscape, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2021), https://perma.cc/F9S2-BDCH; Dan
McCrum, Wirecard: the Timeline, FIN. TIMES (June 25, 2020), https://perma.cc/PH8BZCPP.
137. Attracta Mooney & Patricia Nilsson, Why Did So Many ESG Funds Back
Boohoo?, FIN. TIMES (July 27, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/ead7daea-0457-4a0d9175-93452f0878ec.
138. Elena Escrig-Olmedo et al., Rating the Raters: Evaluating how ESG Rating
Agencies Integrate Sustainability Principles, 11 SUSTAINABILITY 915 (2019).
139. N. Attig et al., Corporate Social Responsibility and Credit Ratings, 117 J. BUS.
ETHICS 679 (2013).
140. K. Saadaoui & T. Soobaroyen, An Analysis of the Methodologies Adopted by
CSR Rating Agencies, 9 SUSTAIN. ACCT., MGMT. & POL’Y J. 43 (2018).
137

Hastings Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 28, No. 2, Summer 2022

such as Environmental.141 Part of the problem lies in the fact that it is not
straightforward to set out ESG indicators that can be used to measure
performance. Research shows it is a challenge to set out a balanced set of
indicators covering all environmental, social and governance aspects.142
This in turn makes it difficult for the outside world to understand how a
firm is performing. It also makes it difficult for a firm itself to set out a
holistic approach for possible improvements.
There might be biases in measuring ESG performance because of the
differing methodologies. For example, studies show that the size of the firm
has a positive effect on its ESG ratings because they are typically able to
assign more resources to disclosing information.143 It could well be that
information being reported is less impactful to the ESG rating assigned than
the absence of information: the latter appears to imply that absence is
regarded as bad news. It raises the question whether the same standards
could be set for smaller companies. In any event, ESG Ratings do not tell
the whole story, as those who do not have sufficient resources to disclose
may not necessarily be performing badly, although it is difficult to argue
transparency cannot be improved. Another possible bias is towards the
short(er) term performance of the firm. ESG Ratings appear to be driving
more short-term changes, particularly in relation to the environmental
factors, in order to achieve rating improvements.144 However, the shortterm changes lack the envisaged holistic and long-term approach which is
preferable.
Besides methodology used, elements covered, and possible biases, the
reliability of ESG Ratings is an important factor as well. The reliability of
ESG assessments has been investigated using reported scandals as
unexpected events, and by studying ESG ratings the year before, during,
and after the event.145 Utz shows that ESG ratings, which include
retrospective information, will deteriorate significantly during such an
event.146 This research also shows that those firms which experience a
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scandal seek to improve their corporate social responsibility arrangements,
which leads to a swift rebound in their ESG rating.147

B. DIFFERENCES IN ESG WORLDWIDE
As ESG performance measurements and ratings have existed for a
while now, it is possible to examine these ratings historically and per
region. A worldwide study shows that ESG scores improved from 2006 to
2017.148 It shows that larger and more profitable firms have done well,
especially in countries that show strong social and economic development.
However, performance in the three ESG categories appears unrelated and
different. And, in contrast with the general trend, U.S. financial services
firms are actually showing a decline in ESG scores.
Apart from global studies, there are also country-specific studies. For
example, in Poland, ESG reporting is still relatively low.149 It was also
found that publishing ESG information improves transparency, thereby
reducing investment risk and information asymmetry, and improving share
price stability. A study in Italy showed that responses to ESG ratings varied
widely amongst different companies.150 It concluded that a majority of the
companies improved their rating by increasing transparency and disclosure,
without significantly changing the underlying ESG aspects. If ratings and
transparency do not lead to such improvements, this paper challenges the
notion that disclosure of non-financial information is sufficient to bring
about a change by way of market efficiency. Research in Australia shows
a positive response to ESG ratings, and an improvement in performance.151
Australia’s improvement manifested itself mostly in the governance
aspects, rather than social and environmental.
Finally, there is the remarkable case of JP Morgan financing the
break-away European Super League. Some of Europe’s top football clubs
planned to leave their domestic league in favor of a newly created and far
more profitable European Super League, despite furious responses from
their fanbases.152 As a result, Standard Ethics, an ESG Rating Agency,
decided to downgrade JP Morgan’s sustainability rating for financing the
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new league. The reasoning behind lowering the rating was that the bank
provided finance in spite of significant stakeholder opposition—in this
case, the stakeholders being football fans. This example, as well as
examples provided previously, clearly shows regional differences and
national influences, as well as non-environmental factors, having a
substantial influence on the ultimate ESG Rating. This is not always helpful
for the purpose of sustainable investments and combating climate change.
An investor would need to know how an ESG Rating is composed and to
what extent individual elements have contributed, in particular the
Environmental aspects. Put simply, an improved ESG rating due to
improved Governance based on increased employee board representation
is now arguably less significant than an improvement in Environmental
aspects due to a reduction in carbon emissions.

C. ESG RATINGS AND INNOVATIVE “SUSTAINABLE SECURITIES”
The discussion above examined ESG rating for firms as a whole. As
discussed, in this case, the ESG disclosure of a firm has a material impact
on the price of its shares or bonds generally. But there are also initiatives
for new types of securities. Besides measuring how climate neutral or
sustainable a corporation is as a whole, these innovative securities look only
at specific assets or financial products, such as, for example, Green Bonds,
used for the financing of specific “green” projects.153 In order to get some
form of standardization in this market, the International Capital Market
Association (“ICMA”) has set out its Green Bond Principles.154 These are
international voluntary guidelines, and mostly set out requirements for the
use and management of proceeds, as well as the reporting thereon. The
EU’s Technical Expert Group (“TEG”) Proposals provide a European
Green Bond Standard155 which would create standards and labels for green
financial products. Not surprisingly, the TEG’s recommendations link the
standards for how the proceeds of such Green Bonds are used pursuant to
the already discussed Taxonomy Regulation. As before, this would allow
for increased comparability by investors and provides yet another way for
promoting sustainable investments. The role of ESG Rating Agencies in
this process is similar to the role of CRAs in structured finance: rather than
providing bonds and complex investment products with a credit rating, they
can provide green bonds with an ESG rating.
Another innovation is the creation of ESG related benchmarks. S&P
Dow Jones is an example of a major financial index provider who has
153. Nathan Bishop, Green Bond Governance and the Paris Agreement, 27 N.Y.U.
ENV’T L.J. 377 (2019).
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created, amongst others, the Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes.156 Like
other equity indexes, these track the share price of a group of companies
deemed to behave in a sustainable way. However, this is not always without
criticism: in 2018, for example, Friends of the Earth accused S&P Dow
Jones of continuing to include Golden-Agri Resources in their Asia-Pacific
sustainability index.157 This Singapore-based firm produces palm oil and is
alleged to do this in a controversial and non-sustainable way in West
Africa. Another example is MSCI, who, besides offering ESG rating
services, also maintains MSCI ESG indexes.158 In short, ESG index
products are in heavy demand and this industry is expected to keep
growing.159 In light of these developments, two EU climate benchmark
products have been introduced by way of amending the EU Benchmark
Regulation (“BMR”): the EU Climate Transition Benchmark and the EU
Paris Aligned Benchmark. This legislation, which will apply to the
benchmark providers, lays out both the minimum requirements for such
benchmarks as well as for the associated reporting requirements. As before,
the aim is to increase comparability as well as prevent any potential
greenwashing.
As a final example, consider the nascent market of ESG derivatives.160
Some of these link sustainability targets to standard derivatives contracts.
For example, an interest rate swap may see reduced payments by one of the
counterparties if it attains certain predefined ESG targets. Others may
trigger penalty payments, to the counterparty or even to a contractually
defined charitable organization, if ESG targets are not met. Other
innovations link credit derivatives, which pay out in case of a default event,
with ESG ratings, arguing that a high ESG rating could be positively
correlated with a lower default probability. As a final example, consider
derivatives such as future contracts on the aforementioned ESG index
products. With financial innovation taking place at such a rapid pace, it
becomes clear that the reliance on ESG data and in particular on ESG
ratings will only increase further.

V. A WAY FORWARD
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A. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The main point of this article has been that ESG Rating Agencies will
inevitably play a crucial role in the EU’s Green Deal. These agencies will
reduce the non-financial information asymmetry and enable a more
efficient market for sustainable investment, thereby transition to a more
sustainable economy. This section sets out the views of various financial
regulators on the role of these agencies. The chairperson of the SEC, Mr.
Jay Clayton, has warned publicly about the risks of using simple ratings to
measure complex issues, such as the ESG impacts, especially in some
aggregated format.161 Mr. Clayton has asserted, “I have not seen
circumstances where combining an analysis of E, S and G together, across
a broad range of companies, for example with a ‘rating’ or ‘score’,
particularly a single rating or score, would facilitate meaningful investment
analysis that was not significantly over-inclusive and imprecise.”162 A clear
example of such potential confusion is the case of Tesla, an electric car
maker, scores highly on “E,” but poorly on “S,” workers’ rights.163 With
rapidly increasing investments finding their way into ESG focused funds,
the main risk is disappointing investors, not due to less aggressive returns,
but because of unsatisfactory ESG records.
The SEC has followed up by publishing a Risk Alert that reviews ESG
investing.164 This study looks at investment firms offering services such as
portfolio management based on ESG investing approaches, related
advertising and marketing, and their associated compliance and internal
oversight frameworks. As the purpose of the study is to provide guidance
to firms, it highlights both a wide range of risks and good practices. For
example, investment firms would not necessarily hold assets in line with
their own ESG policy when measured by sub-advisers’ internal scoring.165
Advice provided to clients is not always in line with the clients’ preferences
on ESG: in some cases certain industry sectors (e.g. tobacco or firearms)
would be prohibited by the client but included in the advice.166 Perhaps
most worrisome, advisers were found to use potentially misleading claims
in regards to ESG approaches, and on some occasions advisers were lacking
the necessary internal controls to safeguard such marketing.167 By
highlighting a few good practices, the SEC emphasizes the accuracy and
consistency for which investors must check when engaging with
161.
162.
163.
164.
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investment managers.168 At the same time, these firms are advised to get
their own internal controls and compliance in order. The central theme here
is to ensure the integrity of any information to the market.
In his speech celebrating the ten year anniversary of the European
Securities and Markets Authority (“ESMA”), the chairperson at the time,
Mr. Steven Maijoor, noted “ESG-washing” as one of the main challenges
in financial markets.169 Two months prior to this speech, ESMA had sent a
letter to the European Commission, outlining its views on the key
challenges for sustainable finance.170 The main issue raised is the currently
“unregulated and unsupervised nature for ESG ratings and ESG assessment
tools” in light of the rapidly growing demand for these products.171 In its
letter, ESMA further highlights the importance of both their quality and
reliability.172 However, ESMA also noted the difficulties in designing any
regulation for the ESG rating industry.173 In particular, it is noted that the
market in both products and rating providers is still developing, and that
ESG rating assessments are complex.174 Nonetheless, the ESMA letter
contains several recommendations.175 For example, any ESG ratings
definition should be made in line with the Taxonomy Regulation. 176
Furthermore, any firm issuing ratings should be authorized and supervised
by a public authority (regulator), setting out conflicts of interest-,
organizational-, and transparency requirements.177 Besides these
requirements for the firms, there should be requirements for the products
(e.g., ratings).178 These could be less prescriptive as for credit ratings, but
should guarantee these are up-to-date, robust, reliable, and so on.179
Recognizing that this could pose barriers of entry for smaller newcomers,
ESMA suggests these requirements are designed in a proportionate way.180
Other financial services regulators are catching up as well. The new
Chief Executive Officer of the UK’s Financial Conducts Authority
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(“FCA”) set out the requirements for premium listed companies to report
their business’s effects from climate change.181 Shortly after, the FCA’s
Director of Strategy reiterated the UK’s commitment to “matching the
ambition of objectives” of the EU’s green policies.182 His main point was
that consumers must be able to trust the information and sustainable
investment products.183 A key issue is that non-financial disclosures are
often incomplete and difficult to compare. It is worth noting the UK
government has mandated the FCA to include reaching a net-zero economy
in their supervision of the financial system.184 The French Autorité des
Marchés Financiers (“AMF”) and the Dutch Autoriteit Financiële Markten
(“AFM”), other European regulators, have published a joint position paper
setting out their observations and priorities.185 In short, they note the
demand for ESG data and services is growing, and with it the necessity for
increased reliability of this data and services. The chairperson of the AMF,
Mr. Robert Ophèle, has highlighted that “regulators cannot accept that
financial products are sold in their country which despite [being labelled as
ESG] seem profoundly different [from other ESG funds].” 186 The proposed
solution is to introduce a regulatory framework for such ESG service
providers, including ESG Rating Agencies, which could also aid in
increasing transparency and managing any conflicts of interests.187

B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE SUPERVISION OF ESG RATING
AGENCIES
The issues raised by the various regulators as well as those in this
paper are serious, especially in light of the role ESG Rating Agencies will
likely play in reallocating investments as envisaged by a part of the EU’s
climate policy. Based on the observations set out previously, one can
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foresee a few ways forward. With ongoing consolidation in the sector,
competition reduces, solidifying the position of a few large players.188
Regulators note that methodologies differ between rating agencies, include
different factors, and generally lack transparency.189 It would be wise to
heed the lessons learned from recent history with CRAs, and some form of
regulatory oversight appears necessary. The most likely candidate for
acting as supervisory authority within the EU would be ESMA, the
objective of which is inter alia to ensure the integrity, transparency,
efficiency, functioning of financial markets, and enhancing investor
protection.190 Moreover, ESMA, as supervisor of European CRAs, already
possesses experience and expertise in the supervision of rating agencies.191
There are a few areas which may serve as a starting point for such
oversight. First, there is the potential for conflict of interests.192 The ESG
data and rating providers are often part of a larger company, which may
provide other services to those obtaining, such as an ESG rating. Another
issue also becomes apparent for CRAs, a conflict of interest. There is a
clear conflict if there is a link between who is paying the rating agency,
whether for this rating or other services, and those obtaining the rating for
themselves or one of their products. Any such conflict should be noted,
managed, and disclosed. Second, there is governance and internal
control.193 These aspects could include, for example, managing the
methodology, reviewing its adequacy, updating how sufficient quality
standards for input data are maintained, etc. It is also clear that the amount
of ESG data available is increasing so rapidly that managing this raw data
is critical. Furthermore, it is vital to set out how to deal with absences of
data (e.g., by way of estimations). In the case of CRAs, it is clear from the
examples of Enron and the Global Financial Crisis that ratings remained
relatively high until it was already widely known that default was
188. Avetisyan & Hockerts, supra note 134.
189. Letter from ESMA to Commissioner Mairead McGuinness, supra note 170, at
2 “the lack of a legally binding definition and comparability among providers of ESG ratings
or legal requirements to ensure transparency of underlying methodologies of such ratings”;
AFM & AMF, supra note 185, at 2, “In particular, the lack of transparency concerning
[Sustainability-related service providers’] methodologies as well as the role of estimates
make it difficult to correctly appreciate what the ratings reflect.”.
190. Article 1 (5) Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European
Securities and Markets Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing
Commission Decision 2009/77/EC, OFF. J. E.U. 331/84 (Dec. 15, 2010),
https://perma.cc/XD8W-S3W6.
191. Credit Rating Agencies, EUR. SECS. & MKTS. AUTH., https://perma.cc/Y377C232.
192. See also ESMA letter to McGuinness, supra note 170, at 3; AFM & AMF, supra
note 185, at 5.
193. See also ESMA letter to McGuinness, supra note 170, at 3; AFM & AMF, supra
note 185, at 9.
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imminent. Such staleness must be prevented. Note that whilst this array for
potential supervision addresses the governance and controls around rating
methodology, it is not proposed to regulate the methodology in itself, which
would be the expertise and value added provided by the individual rating
agencies.
Whilst the methodology itself may not need to be the subject of
prescriptive regulation, more transparency about the rating methodology is
certainly needed.194 It is clear from the example set out previously that
different rating agencies may come to very different ESG ratings for the
same firm. Reasons include a different weighting of the ESG factors, the
approach taken on the non-disclosure of non-financial information, or the
activities in certain countries or regions. Transparency around such
methodology used would improve the comparability and usability of
assigned ratings, as well as allowing the investors to make a better choice
of which ESG rating to use as part of their investment decisions, without
actually prescribing how the rating determination should be performed. In
short, if an investor wants to make investment decisions based on the
climate impact, his preference is likely to be for an ESG rating where the
“E” component plays a far greater role than the “G” – this should be
obvious from the transparency provided by the ESG Rating Agency with
regards to the methodology used. An interesting proposal in this context is
the introduction of specific “corporate climate ratings,” rather than the
broader ESG ratings, as these could isolate the firm’s impact on climate
change.195

VI. CONCLUSION
The concepts behind the European Green Policy appear
straightforward: make sure that the market receives all the non-financial
information necessary to make the right investment decisions in an accurate
and comparable fashion, and, put simply, it will start allocating more
resources towards sustainable companies and projects. Whilst this approach
is not without its critics, this paper focusses on the contribution of
information verifies in making the EUs plan work. Indeed, to make this
Green Policy a reality, many steps are needed along the way. One of these
steps identified in this paper is that all the newly disclosed non-financial
information will be simplified and made more comparable by way of ESG
ratings, in a way that is comparable to the well-known credit ratings in the
structured finance industry. This paper sought to offer some insights into
how ESG ratings and rating agencies work, and what potential trouble may
194. See also ESMA letter to McGuinness, supra note 170, at 3; AFM & AMF, supra
note 185, at 4.
195. Felix Mormann & Milica Mormann, The Case for Corporate Climate Ratings,
53 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1209 (2021).
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be found on the path ahead. There are several question marks, some of
which are fundamental to the ability with which ESG Rating Agencies may
perform their role in reducing information asymmetry between issuers and
investors. For example, questions around the different methodologies or
factors included may reduce the accuracy, comparability, and even the
credibility of such ratings.
Of course, there are alternatives when the non-financial information
provided, or its derived ESG ratings, ultimately prove unsatisfactory.
Further research may examine issues of liability for ESG rating agencies in
case they get it completely wrong, although as with Credit Rating Agencies
it appears this is still a difficult path to go down. 196 Another angle is to what
extent investors may rely on forward-looking ESG statements made by
investees and issuers, and to what extent such statements would be material
disclosures for the reasonable investor – again, this road appears complex,
as well.197 The preferred approach must minimize the need for such private
law action and litigation, even though an effective stick is a helpful backup
plan.
Fortunately, there is an obvious candidate from which lessons can be
drawn to improve the integrity, quality, and comparability of information
available: the Credit Ratings Agencies. Not surprisingly, policy makers are
seeking ways to manage similar issues, such as any conflicts of interest and
maintaining adequate governance and controls around the rating
methodology. This paper has sought to outline the essential role ESG
Rating Agencies will likely play in enabling the shift in allocation of
investments towards sustainable companies and projects as envisaged by
the EU’s climate policy. It is recommended that such lessons learned, both
positive and negative, are applied and implemented to this rating industry
to ensure it is up to this task.198
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